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Dekel and Piccione (2000) have proven that information cascades do not necessarily
aﬀect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard
conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an
equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can
abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting:
the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative
properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when
the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting
mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, D82.I Introduction
Despite the fact that much attention in the theoretical literature has been focused on si-
multaneous voting mechanisms, many important decisions are actually taken in sequential
mechanisms. This is certainly the case of presidential primaries, and of roll-call voting
in legislatures; but it is often the case that even mechanisms that are supposed to be
simultaneous, are not in practice, because late voters generally have access to exit polls
and other information describing the choice of early voters.1 A famous example is the 1980
Presidential election in which the news that Ronald Reagan was winning by a landslide
changed expectation “suddenly and dramatically.”2 The “popular” intuition, therefore,
is that because of bandwagon eﬀects, timing matters. This view is also supported with
strong historical and experimental evidence (see Hung and Plott, 2000, and Morton and
Williams, 2000a and 2000b).
In an inﬂuential contribution, however, Dekel and Piccione (2000) have shown that
informative symmetric equilibria of a simultaneous voting game with two options are
equilibria in any sequential voting structure as well; and in unanimity games the sets of
equilibria in simultaneous and sequential games are identical. As they have concluded,
this result "completely demolishes any hope of obtaining strong conclusions about en-
dogenous timing [...] and it extends the successful aggregation results of Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1997) to any sequential voting environment."3 T h er e s u l ti sv e r ys u r p r i s i n g
because it runs precisely against the popular intuition and shows that the literature on
informational cascades cannot be directly applied to voting games.
In this paper we argue that when voters can abstain, the equivalence between theequilibria of sequential and simultaneous voting games is sensitive to the introduction
of any, even arbitrarily small, cost of voting.4 Indeed, when this is the case the set of
equilibria of sequential and simultaneous games are generally disjoint. What is relevant
in our "non-equivalence" result, however, is not only the theoretical fact that equilibria
are diﬀerent; but, also, the more important implication that these diﬀerences may have a
non-ambiguous impact on the ability of the election to aggregate information. Despite the
fact that it is very diﬃcult to characterize all equilibria of a sequential game (which can
be asymmetric, and certainly history contingent), we present a simple, yet general result
on the comparative properties of information aggregation in sequential and simultaneous
voting mechanisms. When the cost of voting is small and n is large, information aggre-
gation is always maximized by choosing a simultaneous voting game: in large elections,
t h e r ei sa l w a y saq∗-rule in correspondence of which the unique symmetric equilibrium
of the simultaneous voting game dominates in information aggregation all the equilibria
(even asymmetric) of a sequential election; moreover, no equilibrium of any q-rule of a
sequential game dominates the simultaneous voting game with this q∗-rule.
The intuition of these results is simple. Both in a simultaneous and in a sequential
election, agents evaluate the net beneﬁt of voting for a particular alternative conditioning
on the event of being pivotal. After any history of a sequential election, the expected
beneﬁt of voting for some alternative is proportional,b u tn o tequal to the net expected
beneﬁt in a simultaneous voting game. Both beneﬁts are proportional to the expected
value of the alternative conditional on being pivotal. Their factor of proportionality is
the ratio of the probabilities of being pivotal after the history (in a sequential game) and
1ex-ante (in the simultaneous game). While the utility conditional on being pivotal is not
history dependent if voters receive symmetric signals, the probability of being pivotal is
always history dependent. This is irrelevant if the cost of voting is exactly zero, since
the factor of proportionality is weakly positive. But when there is a cost of voting, even
if arbitrarily small, the magnitude of the probability of being pivotal is important for the
voter’s decision, and since it aﬀects the decision to abstain, which is history dependent,
it aﬀects the number of informative signals that can be aggregated in the election as well.
Since Dekel and Piccione (2000), the lite r a t u r eh a sn o tb e e na b l et or e c o n c i l et h e
theory of rational voting in sequential and simultaneous elections with the evidence cited
above on diﬀerences in voting outcomes. It has been suggested that particular behavioral
assumptions on voters’ preferences are needed (Callander, 2003). This is certainly a
promising research line. Our results, however, contribute by explaining the diﬀerences in
information aggregation between simultaneous and sequential voting mechanisms while
remaining in the realm of the rational choice paradigm, and relying only on strategic
abstention, which is a fact documented by robust evidence.5
On the normative side, our results also contribute to the debate on the optimal design
of elections and their timing.6 Scholars and prominent policy makers have argued that
sequential elections give lesser known candidates a chance to emerge, and limit the advan-
tage of strong incumbents.7 In these cases, it is argued that sequential elections may be
superior in aggregating voters’ preferences, despite the risk of bandwagon eﬀects. Based
on these considerations, in 1996, the Republican Convention oﬀered bonus delegates to
states willing to schedule primaries later in the season:8 as noted by Morton and Williams
2(1999), "these changes were based on the premise that sequential primaries allow later
voters to make more informed (and perhaps "better") decisions than they would in si-
multaneous voting."9 Our results, however, provide conditions under which simultaneous
elections allow a superior aggregation of information even when candidates are ex ante
heterogeneous.
The next section presents the model. Section 3 presents the general results on the
equivalence of equilibria in sequential and simultaneous voting games. In order to study
information aggregation, in Section 4 we consider a setting in which voters have common
values and the only purpose of the election is information aggregation: here we focus on the
environment introduced by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and prove that a simultaneous
election dominates sequential elections in the sense described above. Section 5 concludes.
II The model
In this section we present a simple model of voting which will be used throughout the
analysis to compare sequential with simultaneous voting.
We assume that there are n v o t e r sw h oh a v et od e c i d eb e t w e e nt w oo p t i o n s : t h e
status quo N a n da na l t e r n a t i v eY . The votes are aggregated using an anonymous and
monotonic decision rule. For any such aggregation rule, we can deﬁne a real number
q ∈ [0,1] such that Y is chosen if and only if it receives at least a fraction q of cast votes.
We normalize the value of the status quo to zero. Each agent has a value vi ∈ Vi ≡
[−1,1] for Y . We assume that the vector of values is not observable by any agent, but





i Vi and x =( x1,...,xn) and v =( v1,...,vn). The joint probability distribution
of these two vectors is given by an atomless density function f (v,x). We assume that
E(vi |x−i,x i) is strictly increasing in xi for any x−i.10
Voting games may have T periods. In each period a subset of agents has the opportu-
nity to vote simultaneously. The agents who have the opportunity to vote are denoted by
V (t) and ti is the period in which voter i has the opportunity. For simplicity, we consider
sequential games in which the number of agents who have the opportunity to vote at each
stage is a constant s: s = |V (t)| = |V (t0)|. T h eo u t c o m ei sd e c i d e da tt h ee n do ft h el a s t
stage, and at each stage voters can see the action taken by voters who decide in previous
stages. We deﬁne a sequential voting game a roll-call voting game in which voters choose
in a purely sequential way voting one after the other; a “hybrid” system in which voters
vote in T steps is called a T-stage system. For simplicity, we will consider populations
such that T = n
s is an integer.
Each voter has three options: he can vote for alternative Y , vote for the status quo
N or abstain, A. A strategy for a voter is therefore a function that maps the player’s
signal and the observed history of votes into the probability of voting and the probability
of choosing Y : ϕi : Hti × Xi → [0,1]
2 where Ht is the set of histories of length t which
describes how each agent j ∈
St−1
l=1 V (l) behaved. Diﬀerently from Dekel and Piccione
(2000), however, an agent who decides to vote incurs a cost c which can be arbitrarily
small, but strictly positive.
For notational convenience we shall denote the probability of choosing Y conditional
on voting si (hti,x i) and the probability of abstaining from voting ai (hti,x i).G i v e n
4a strategy proﬁle ϕ =( ϕ1,...,ϕn), moreover, it useful to deﬁne the expectation of vi
conditional on a history hti a n da ne v e n tP: Eϕ [vi;hti,P].
III (Non-)Equivalence results
In this section we compare equilibria in sequential and simultaneous voting models. First
we show that there is a sense in which the two sets of equilibria are equivalent if we
assume that the cost of voting is exactly zero. We then show that this equivalence does
not generalize to the case in which there is a cost of voting, even if arbitrarily small.
Dekel and Piccione (2000) have studied the equivalence of the equilibria in simultane-
ous and sequential voting systems in which three assumptions hold:
Assumption 1 (Agents’ Symmetry) For any agent i,j, Xi = Xj and Vi = Vj;a n d
f(v,x)=f(Tijv,Tijx) for any i,j,a n da n yv,x.11
Assumption 2 (Full Support) For any v,i ff(v,x) > 0 for some x,t h e nf(v,x0) > 0 for
any x0.
Assumption 3 (No Abstention) Abstention is not allowed.
Given these conditions, they have proven that a voting proﬁle ϕ∗ is a symmetric equilib-
rium with informative strategies of the simultaneous game if and only if it is an equilibrium
of the sequential game. Informative strategies are simply strategies that are responsive
to private information:
Deﬁnition 1 As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is informative if for each voter i there is at least a history
hti and some pair of signals x,x0, such that after observing x the agent votes for Y with
positive probability, and after observing x0 votes for N with positive probability.
5The next proposition extends Dekel and Piccione’s (2000) equivalence result between
equilibria in sequential and simultaneous games when the agents can abstain but the cost
of voting is zero. Although the argument is similar to the argument used in Dekel and
Piccione (2000), it is worth noting that in their model the equivalence result does not
necessarily hold with abstention, even if the cost of voting is zero. Dekel and Piccione
assume a ﬁnite set of signals. In this case there may be equilibria in which agents are
indiﬀerent between voting for Y (or N) and abstaining when they condition on the pivotal
event. If after these signals the agent uses a mixed strategy, voters who vote later would
optimally condition their actions on the outcome of the randomization since this would
reveal information on the actual signal observed by the voter who randomizes.12 Such
equilibria of the sequential game would be history dependent and could not be played in
a simultaneous game.13
This problem does not arise in our environment since, with continuous signals, the
probability that an agent is indiﬀerent between two alternatives is zero: therefore poste-
riors are independent of the strategies (even mixed) used in these events. Let ϕ be a
proﬁle of informative and symmetric strategies:
Proposition 1 Assume Assumptions 1-2 and c =0 . In any anonymous and monotonic
decision rule with abstention, a proﬁle ϕ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the simulta-







such that for each agent i, ϕT
i (hti,x i)=ϕi (xi) for any hti and xi.
The key assumption in this result is that the cost of voting is exactly zero. In this
case, the expected beneﬁto fv o t i n gY in a simultaneous game -deﬁned usim
i (Y,xi)-i st h e
6expected value of vi conditional on being pivotal Eϕ(vi |Piv i;xi) times the probability
of being pivotal Prϕ(Piv i;xi).14 In a sequential game, however, after any history hti the
beneﬁto fv o t i n gY for an agent in a sequential voting game -deﬁned u
seq
i (Y ;hti,x i)-
is proportional to the utility in a simultaneous game, but it is not equal because the
probability of being pivotal depends on the history of previous votes: clearly it is positive










Prϕ(Piv; xi) ≥ 0. When the cost of voting is zero the fact that utilities
are only proportional is strategically irrelevant: the sign of the utility of voting Y always
(weakly) agree, so the optimal choice in a simultaneous game is still weakly optimal in
a sequential game if the voting cost is zero.15 In a model of voting with abstention and
positive voting cost, however, the magnitude of the factor of proportionality Λ(xi,h ti) is
important for the voters’ choice.
As in Dekel and Piccione (2000), Proposition 1 considers informative strategies in
which all agents use the signals that they receive. If we are interested in the properties
of information aggregation in equilibrium, this requirement may be too strong. It might
be that we are not interested in the fact that the equivalence between simultaneous or
sequential voting games fails if we require that all agents are informative. We might be
satisﬁed if the equivalence holds for equilibria that aggregate only some information. The
next result, however, shows that even considering asymmetric equilibria in which some
7voters are not informative, the equivalence fails if there is any, even arbitrarily small, cost
of voting:
Proposition 2 For any c>0,n os t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle ϕ that is an equilibrium of a simultane-
ous voting game in which m agents are informative, is ever an equilibrium of any T-stage
voting game with T ≥ 2 n
m.
Proof. Assume that ϕ = {ϕ1 (x1,h t1),...,ϕn (xn,h tn)} is an equilibrium of the simul-







ti. Assume also, by contradiction, that ϕ is an equilibrium of some T-stage voting
game with T ≥ 2 n
m in which at least m agents are informative. We proceed in two simple
steps.
Step 1. We ﬁrst show that all agents who have the opportunity to vote at T must
abstain after any history and any signal. Given T ≥ 2 n
m,t h e r ea r ea tl e a s tm ≥ 2n
T
informative voters: so we can assume without loss of generality that there are at least
n
T informative voters who have the opportunity to vote before period T. Assume ﬁrst
that the number of uninformative voters who always abstain is some k ∈ [0,n− m] and
the number of uninformative voters voting Y is larger or equal to dq(n − k)e− n
T.16 Then
there exists a history h1
T in which all the informative voters are voting Y , so that the total
number of voters voting Y is at least V (Y ) ≥ dq(n − k)e. After this history, an agent
voting at stage T would never be pivotal, therefore he would abstain after any signal.
Since ϕ is history independent, this implies that any agent voting at T is abstaining after
any history and any signal. Assume now that the number of uninformative voters who
vote for Y before T is strictly less than dq(n − k)e − n
T. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h e r ei sah i s t o r y
8h2
T in which all the informative voters vote N.A f t e r h2
T, the number of voters voting
for N must be larger than (1 − q)(n − k). This proves that there is a history in which
t h ev o t e r sa tt h eTth stage would not be pivotal. Because ϕ is history independent, this
implies that they would always abstain.
Step 2. Consider now the induction step assuming that for some t ∈ (1,T), all voters
l who vote after t are uninformative because they always abstain. Since there are no
informative agents after t and the number of informative voters is m ≥ 2n
T, we can also
assume without loss of generality that there are at least n
T informative voters who have
the opportunity to vote before t. Therefore an argument similar to Step 1 shows that
the agents who have the opportunity to vote at t must be always abstaining. We can
t h e r e f o r ec o n c l u d et h a tt h e r ea r en oi n f o r m a t i v ev o t e r se x c e p ta tm o s ti nt h eﬁrst stage
of the voting game. This is, however, impossible since in the ﬁrst stage there are only n
T
voters. We therefore conclude that either in ϕ there are less than m informative voters,
or the sequential voting game has less than n
m stages.
The previous result is general because it holds for any equilibria, even asymmetric,
independently of the order of voting, and if the cost of voting is arbitrarily small.17 Two
immediate corollaries follow from Proposition 2. For any c>0, an equilibrium which
aggregates the signals of at least two informative voters of a simultaneous game cannot
be an equilibrium of the fully sequential game (i.e. when T = n). Moreover, for any
c>0, no equilibrium with informative strategies of the simultaneous game (i.e. when all
voters are informative, n = m) can be an equilibrium of any T-stage voting game with
more than one stage.
9The bottom line of Proposition 2 is that the comparison between the properties of
a simultaneous and a sequential game is diﬃcult with abstention because there are no
easy parallels between equilibria. In a sense, Proposition 1 opens a "Pandora’s box:" the
only way to compare the two environments is to calculate the equilibria of the two games;
but this is extremely diﬃcult since, at least in the sequential game, these are necessarily
history dependent.
Without abstention, Dekel and Piccione’s (2000) equivalence results can be used to
draw strong conclusions on the informative content of the equilibria in a simultaneous and
sequential game, showing general conditions for the two electoral systems to be informa-
tively equivalent. Proposition 2 does not have immediate implications for informativeness,
it simply says that the set of equilibria are disjoint and cannot be easily compared. In
the next section, however, we show a general environment in which we can compare the
informational properties of simultaneous and sequential voting games, and we can prove
that, with small cost of voting, the set of equilibria in simultaneous games are generally
uniformly more informative when the appropriate q- r u l ei sc h o s e n .
IV Information aggregation
As we mentioned in the Introduction, the comparative study of simultaneous and sequen-
tial elections has been motivated in the literature by the hypothesis that informational
cascades may occur in sequential elections, and aﬀect information aggregation in a pre-
dictable way. The results that we have presented in the previous section prove that
strategic abstention makes the set of equilibria disjoint in the two systems, but they do
10not help to rank the informative properties of the equilibria. In this section, we show that
for any large n, if the cost of voting is small, information aggregation is maximized by
choosing a simultaneous voting game:t h e r ei sa l w a y saq∗-rule in correspondence of which
the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting game generally strictly dom-
inates in information aggregation all the equilibria (even asymmetric) of the sequential
system in which a given number of voters vote simultaneously at each stage; moreover no
equilibrium of any q-rule of the sequential game dominates the simultaneous voting game
with this q∗-rule.
To study the informative properties of the equilibria, we focus attention on the envi-
ronment introduced by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). This is a special version of the
model presented in Section II in three ways. First, there are only two states of the world
{Y,N}. We assume that state Y has prior probability π ∈ (0,1). Second preferences
are represented by ui(Y,Y)=ui(N,N)=v>0 and ui(N,Y)=ui(Y,N)=0for any
i =1to n,w h e r et h eﬁrst argument of ui is the alternative selected by the outcome of
the election and the second is the state of the world. Third, as also in the section on
common values in Dekel and Piccione (2000), we now assume that each voter can privately
observe only two signals {g,b}. We assume that signals are conditionally independent





. To make this environment
non trivial we make an assumption that guarantees that the outcome should depend on
the signals. Deﬁne the posterior probability that the state is Y when there are k "g"
signals out of n:
βn (k)=
πpk(1 − p)n−k
πpk(1 − p)n−k +( 1− π)pn−k(1 − p)k.
11It is easy to prove that in the benchmark case with complete information, a voter would
prefer alternative Y if βn (k) > 1
2. We assume:
Assumption 4 (Non-Triviality) There is a number of signals k such that βn (k) > 1
2 >
βn (k − 1).
Clearly, this condition is satisﬁed for any generic choice of π and p when n is large
enough. As in the previous Sections, we deﬁne a q-rule as the rule in which alternative
Y passes if and only if it receives at least a fraction q o ft h ec a s tv o t e s . K e e p i n gp, π
and v constant (but arbitrary), a voting environment is therefore characterized by the
parameters {c,n,q}. For any {c,n,q},w ec a nh a v eag a m eΓsim (c,n,q) in which agents
vote simultaneously; or a game Γseq (c,n,q,s) in which s ≥ 1 voters vote simultaneously
at each of the T = n
s stages. Here too, we will consider populations of size n such that
t h en u m b e ro fs t a g e si sa ni n t e g e r .
In this setting, there is an unequivocal way to rank the informative value of these
voting games. We say that an equilibrium of the simultaneous voting system with q-rule
weakly dominates an equilibrium of the sequential system if and only if the probability
of committing a mistake in Γsim (c,n,q) is not larger than in Γseq (c,n,q,s);i tstrictly
dominates if the probability of a mistake is strictly smaller.18
The next result shows that, when n is large, simultaneous voting is superior to se-
quential voting if the cost of voting is small, independently of the number of voters s who
vote simultaneously at each stage.
Proposition 3 Let ε be an arbitrarily small number. There is a n such that for any
n>n there are two cutoﬀs c2(n) <εand c1(n) <c 2(n),a n daq∗ (n) ∈ (0,1) such that:
12i) If the q∗ (n)-rule is adopted, the unique symmetric and informative equilibrium
of Γsim (c,n,q∗ (n)) weakly dominates any equilibrium of Γseq(c,n,q∗ (n),s) for any c<
c2(n); and it strictly dominates for any c such that c1(n) <c≤ c2(n).
ii) Moreover, no equilibrium of any other q-rule of the sequential game Γseq(c,n,q,s)
dominates the symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting game with this q∗ (n)-rule.
This result has an immediate implication. In order to aggregate information with
large n, there is never a rationale to choose a sequential election system if the cost of
voting is small enough (i.e., c ≤ c2(n)) :t h e r ei sa l w a y saq∗-rule, that is unbeatable by
any equilibrium of any q-rule of the sequential game. Indeed, when c ∈ (c1(n),c 2(n)] the
simultaneous system is strictly optimal, regardless of the equilibrium choice.19
In the c ∈ (c1(n),c 2(n)] interval, simultaneous voting is superior because it induces
lower incentives to abstain, and therefore it elicits a larger number of informative signals.
When c is very small (i.e., c ≤ c1(n)), however, abstention is not necessarily an issue for
information aggregation even in sequential elections: this is why the two voting games may
be equivalent in (0,c 1(n)]. A l t h o u g hi ti sr e a s o n a b l et oa s s u m et h a tt h ec o s to fv o t i n gi s
small, it is not plausible to assume that it is inﬁnitesimal relative to the other parameters
of the model. How much is c1(n) smaller than c2(n)? Indeed if c1(n) converges to
zero faster than c2(n) as n →∞ , then the range (c1(n),c 2(n)] essentially coincides with
(0,c 2(n)] in large elections. We have:
Proposition 4 As n →∞ ,
c1(n)
c2(n) → 0.
These results should be interpreted in the light of the existing debate on optimal
timing of elections. Two opposite camps have disputed the merits of sequential versus
13simultaneous elections (see Morton and Williams, 2000b, for an extensive account). One
side of this dispute, as mentioned in the Introduction, claims that sequential elections give
lesser known candidates a chance to emerge, and therefore limit the natural advantage of
strong incumbents. In these cases, even if the prior favors the incumbent, it is argued
that voters can learn from previous votes and update their posterior beliefs. This opinion
is supported (and perhaps suggested) by a few famous episodes in which "dark horses"
emerged in early primaries of presidential elections, as with George McGovern in 1972,
Jimmy Carter in 1976, and Gary Hart in 1984; as well as by some careful econometric
evidence of these learning eﬀects (Bartels, 1986 and 1988, Norrander, 1983, and others).
In an attempt to separate irrational momentum from real learning in the 1984 Democratic
primaries, Bartels notes that:
"Although there is some room here for a momentum eﬀect independent of real
political content, it seems clear that no apolitical bandwagon hypothesis can
account for the broad patterns of response to Hart’s emergence".20
Morton and Williams (1999), similarly, have shown with theoretical arguments and exper-
imental evidence that in environments with symmetric information sequential elections
may help voters to coordinate on superior candidates, and therefore improve the ability
of the electoral system to aggregate preferences. Many policy makers have embraced
these opinions: as mentioned in the Introduction, these arguments has even led the 1996
Republican Convention to explicitly discourage the concentration of primaries.
The "learning" story which is used to justify the evidence presented above implic-
itly assumes that naive voters always vote informatively using their signals even if it is
14not individually rational, or assumes symmetric information and focuses on coordination
problems (as in Morton and Williams, 1999). Those who favor simultaneous elections,
however, have suggested that at some stage of the election, voters would necessarily stop
learning and fall trapped in bandwagon eﬀects in which little information is aggregated.
Taking the opposite position of the 1996 Republican Convention cited above, Bikhchan-
dani et al. (1992) suggested that "the Super Tuesday, in which many southern states
coordinate their primaries on the same date, was an attempt to avoid the consequences of
sequential voting."21 Although focused on individualistic institutions in which the action
of a player does not directly aﬀect other players’ payoﬀs, the literature on herding behav-
ior (Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992) has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the research
on voting models. Motivated by this literature, Hung and Plott (2001), for example,
have produced experimental evidence showing that information cascades occur in voting
models as well; and Callander (2003) has rationalized information cascades in elections
with a behavioral model in which voters prefer to vote for a winner.
The important contribution of Deckel and Piccione (2000) is to clarify this debate
showing that, because rational voters vote contingent on being pivotal, the literature on
information cascades can not be directly applied to voting games. According to their
results, however, both sides are incorrect: on the one hand, strategic voters do not learn
from previous voters because they act as if they are pivotal; and on the other hand,
exactly when a "bandwagon equilibrium" is possible in a sequential election, the same is
also possible in a simultaneous election: so there is no reason to prefer one system to the
other on this ground. Their results, therefore, seem to "demolish any hope" to solve this
15debate on the timing of elections remaining in standard voting theory (founded on the
assumption that voters are rational and strategic).22
Clearly, this paper cannot solve the debate described above; our results, however,
contribute to it in two ways. First, from a normative perspective, we show that it
is generally possible to rank the informative properties of simultaneous and sequential
voting systems in a non ambiguous way that does not depend on the particular choice
of equilibria. And, second, they have a positive implication as well. As mentioned, an
argument in favor of sequential elections is that they are better in aggregating information
when one alternative has an initial advantage over the other. This advantage is measured
in this model by the initial prior π. Propositions 3 and 4, however, are true even if
the alternatives are heterogeneous (π>1/2 or π<1/2): in this case, too, there is a
monotonic decision rule in a simultaneous election that dominates any decision rule of
any equilibrium of the sequential election. Interestingly, the logic why simultaneous
elections are superior to sequential elections is diﬀerent from the intuition suggested by
the literature on information cascades. In our model, the fact that voters do not know
other voters’ choices works as a commitment device to vote: in a sequential election
this commitment device is absent and voters ﬁnd it optimal to abstain when an interim
outcome suggests that one option is winning (and so the probability of being pivotal is
small). This logic is conﬁrmed by evidence on voters’ behavior, who are more likely to
abstain when the probability of being pivotal is small (see Jackson, 1983, and Rosenthal
and Sen, 1973).
The results presented above, however, leave a few open questions. First, given a
16particular q-rule (not necessarily the optimal q∗-rule): is a simultaneous or a sequential
voting system better? It is very hard to obtain general results for this question. The
power of Propositions 3 and 4 derives from the fact that when c is small, it is always possi-
ble to ﬁnd a q-rule which guarantees that informative voting is rational in a simultaneous
game; this is generally impossible, even when c is small, in a sequential voting system with
large n.B y c h o o s i n g t h e q-rule, we can focus on a case in which the equilibrium of the
simultaneous game has a nice property: informative voting is rational. To compare the
properties of the electoral system, then, we only need to prove that for large n and small
c, this is impossible in a sequential game. When q is arbitrary, informative voting is not
necessarily rational in simultaneous elections; therefore, to compare the voting systems,
we would need to compare the outcomes in the two sets of mixed strategies equilibria:
these sets may be very complicated.
A strictly related question concerns the case when the cost of voting c is large and it
is not possible to ﬁnd a q-rule for which informative voting is rational in a simultaneous
election. In this case the comparison between the electoral systems depends on the
parameters describing the environment; but there are situations in which sequential voting
may improve information aggregation. We show this fact with an example.
Example 1 Consider an environment with the same payoﬀs and signal structure as de-
scribed above in this section, and set π =1 /2. There are two voters who decide by
majority rule: if they disagree, or if they both abstain, then option Y is chosen with
probability 1/2. The cost of voting is α
2 (2p − 1)v,w h e r eα<1 but is close to one.
In this case, the cost of voting is almost equal to the expected utility of choosing Y
17(respectively, N) when a voter is alone and only one signal g (respectively, b) is available
(i.e., 1
2 (2p − 1)v); and there is never an equilibrium in which the two voters always vote
informatively in the simultaneous election: if this were true, a voter would be pivotal
precisely when the other voter has received the opposite signal; but in this case the
posterior would be 1/2, the voter would be indiﬀerent between the options, and abstention
would be optimal.23 There is, however, a symmetric equilibrium in which voters abstain
with probability λ, and vote informatively with probability 1−λ. In this equilibrium the
expected net beneﬁt of voting would be λ−α
2 (2p−1).24 Since in this case each voter must
be indiﬀerent between voting and abstaining, it must be that in a symmetric equilibrium
λ = α.S o a s α → 1, the probability of a mistake approaches 1/2 in the symmetric
equilibrium of the simultaneous game, since the voters almost always abstain. There
is, however, an equilibrium of the sequential game in which the ﬁrst voter abstains and
the second voter votes informatively.25 In this case the probability of a mistake is only
1 − p<1/2, so the sequential election is better in aggregating information.26 Intuitively,
the reason why the equilibrium in the sequential election is better than the symmetric
equilibrium of the simultaneous election is that it allows the voters to coordinate their
actions: the ﬁrst voter credibly delegates decision power to the second. In a symmetric
equilibrium of a simultaneous game this coordination is lost when there is no pure strategy
equilibrium (as in Proposition 3), and the equilibrium can be ineﬃcient with large c.
Finally, how large is the advantage in information aggregation for the simultaneous
voting system when the cost of voting is small? The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 show
that there is no equilibrium in the sequential game with a q- r u l et h a ti sa si n f o r m a t i v ea s
18the symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous game with a q∗-rule; but it does not provide
a full characterization of all the possible equilibria in the sequential game. Because of
this, we cannot prove that there are no equilibria of the sequential game that converge to
the equilibrium of the simultaneous game in terms of information aggregation. However,
there is no reason to believe this or, more in general, to believe that the informative
properties of the two classes of equilibria are in any way comparable. The fact that
voters abstain after some history clearly aﬀects the expected value of any previous voter.
In order to quantify these eﬀects, it would be necessary to characterize not one, but all
possible equilibria.
VC o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown that when voters can abstain and there is a cost to voting, the set
of informative equilibria of simultaneous and sequential elections with binary choices are
disjoint, even if the cost of voting is arbitrarily small. This may imply, as the popular
intuition and history seems to suggest, that the two systems aggregate information in
diﬀerent ways; indeed we have shown that when the cost of voting is small there is always
a q-rule in correspondence of which the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates in a
strong sense a sequential mechanism from an informative point of view.
Is abstention really strategic and does it really play in reality the same role as in our
argument? Jackson (1983) analyzed data on individual turnout in the 1980 Presidential
election in what resembles a classical natural experiment. He assessed whether exposure
to election night news reduced the likelihood of voting among those exposed. Consistently
19with our theory, he concludes that hearing news of the projected outcome decreased
the likelihood of voting among those who had not already voted.27 Strategic abstention,
therefore seems to be an important component in voting games that are not simultaneous.
20Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let ϕ be a symmetric strategy proﬁle in which the strategy for any agent i depends
only on the agent’s signal xi. Given that all agents except at most i are following such a
symmetric strategy, assume that agent i is indiﬀerent between voting and abstaining after
observing a signal xi and conditioning on being pivotal (i.e., Eϕ(vi |Piv,xi)=0 ). Then
any agent with signal x0
i >x i or x0
i <x i w o u l dh a v eas t r i c tp r e f e r e n c et ov o t ef o rY or
N. Therefore the measure of voters who abstain in any symmetric equilibrium is zero.
This implies that for any agent i there is only one family of pivotal events that receives
positive probability: when all voters vote, and exactly dqne−1 vote for Y (where dxe is the
minimal integer larger or equal than x). Let us denote Pi this family of events in which a
voter is pivotal with positive probability. By anonymity and the assumption of symmetric
distribution of signals, for any P,P0 ∈ Pi, Eϕ [vi;hti,P]=Eϕ [vi;hti,P0]=Eϕ [vi;P] in
any symmetric equilibrium ϕ, since the identity of the "yes" and "no" voters is irrelevant.
The utility of a voter to vote "yes" is therefore
u(vi;xi)=P r ( Pi;vi;ϕ)Eϕ [vi;P].
Since by the full support assumption Pr(Pi;vi;ϕ) > 0,av o t e ri strictly prefers to vote
for N if Eϕ[vi;P] > 0, is indiﬀerent if Eϕ[vi;P]=0and strictly prefers if Eϕ [vi;P] < 0.
Consider now a agent in a T-stage voting game in an equilibrium which may be history
21dependent. His utility after a history hti is




Pr(Pi; vi,ϕ) ≥ 0 for any hti by, again, the full support assumption. To
show the suﬃciency part of the claim, note that:
u(vi;hti,x i) > 0 ⇒ u(vi;xi) > 0
u(vi;hti,x i) < 0 ⇒ u(vi;xi) < 0
so if after history hti the voter has strict preferences, then he would behave as if he did
not know the history. However u(vi;hti,x i)=0does not imply u(vi;xi)=0because
it could be that Λ(hti)=0 .T o p r o v e s u ﬃciency, assume now that ϕ= {ϕi (xi)}
n
i=1 is
an equilibrium of the sequential game and: u(vi;hti,x i)=0 , and the agent votes "no"
with positive probability after history hti;b u tu(vi;xi) > 0, and the voter would vote
"yes" in the simultaneous game. Let h0
ti be a history in which the probability of being
pivotal is strictly positive. Since the strategy is history independent, it must be that
u(vi;h0
ti,x i) ≤ 0, which implies u(vi;xi) ≤ 0, a contradiction. Analogously, we can prove
that if u(vi;hti,x i)=0and "no" is voted with positive probability, then u(vi;xi) ≥ 0.
We conclude that after observing only xi,av o t e rm u s tﬁnd it optimal to vote as after
{hti,x i}.
22Consider now necessity. We have:
u(vi;xi) > 0 ⇒ u(vi;hti,x i) ≥ 0
u(vi;xi) < 0 ⇒ u(vi;hti,x i) ≤ 0
u(vi;xi)=0 ⇒ u(vi;hti,x i)=0 .
Therefore any strategy that is strictly or (weakly) optimal in a simultaneous game is
weakly optimal in a sequential game. ¥
B . P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s3a n d4
To prove Propositions 3 and 4 it is useful to show a preliminary result. Let θ1, θ2, αj1,
αj2 j =1 ,2,a n dπ be parameters with α1 =( α11,α 12), α2 =( α21,α 22), θ =( θ1,θ 2);a n d














































Lemma 1 Assume kn is a non decreasing sequence such that kn ≤ n−1
2 ∀n and kn →∞
as n →∞ ;a n dvn is a sequences of integers which may take value from 0 to a ﬁnite
integer ι.F o r a n y αji ∈ (0,1) ∀j,i, π ∈ (0,1), θ1 ∈ (0,1), θ2 ∈ (0,1) with θ1 6= θ2,a n d
either θ1 or θ2 is larger than 1
2 and the other lower than 1







23Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that θ1 > 1








n (α1,θ) can be written as:
A(n) ·
Ã






































in (B.5) is bounded above by one, it can be shown that
A(n) is bounded above by a constant φ1, so we can focus on the second term in (B.4).












From 0 <k≤ n−1












¢n−1−k < 1,s o :
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√
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converges to zero as




2 are bounded, and θ
vn+1
2 is bounded below by θ
ι+1






,i ti sw e l lk n o w nt h a tlimx→∞
√
πx







n (α1,θ) converges to zero as n →∞ .
We can now prove Proposition 3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Given Assumption 4, for any n we can ﬁnd a q∗ ∈ (0,1)
such that: βn (dq∗ne − 1) < 1
2 <β n (dq∗ne).L e t q∗
n = dq∗ne, so that if there is no
abstention Y is chosen if and only if there are at least q∗
n votes for Y . Observe, moreover,
that it must be that n−q∗
n →∞as n →∞ .D e n o t e Pq∗
n the pivotal event in which q∗
n-1
out of n-1 voters vote for "yes" and n−q∗
n out of n-1 vote for "no". By the deﬁnition of
q∗, both the expected utility of voting "yes" conditional on event Pq∗




¯ ¯x = g,Pq∗
n
¤
, and the expected utility of voting "no" conditional on Pq∗
n
and a signal b,i . e .E
£
u(vote N)
¯ ¯x = b,Pq∗
n
¤
, are strictly positive and the voter would
either vote according to the signal (informatively) or abstain. We consider now two cases.
25Case 1: Assume ﬁrst that q∗
n ≤ n+1
2 .W e d e ﬁne c2 (n) as:











where α = {α1,α 2}, θ = {θ1,θ 2},a n dγ = {γ1,γ2} are given by: α1 =1− p, α2 = p;
γ1 = p, γ2 =1− p; θ1 = p, θ2 =1− p;a n d :















The variable c2 (n) is a lower bound on the expected value of voting informatively in the
simultaneous voting game (e
q∗
n−1
n (α,θ) and e
q∗
n−1
n (γ,θ) are the interim probability of being
pivotal when there is no abstention, after the agent observes, respectively, a "b"a n da" g"
signal). If c<c 2 (n) the voters in a simultaneous election always ﬁnd it strictly optimal
to vote informatively. Therefore, the simultaneous election is never strictly dominated
by any sequential election (regardless of the q-rule used in the sequential election and of
the equilibrium selection) since, at most, the equilibrium in the sequential cases uses the
same number of informative signals as in the simultaneous game. Therefore, we only
have to verify that there is a threshold c1(n) <c 2(n) such that when c ∈ (c1(n),c 2(n)) the
sequential election with q∗-rule described by Γseq(c,n,q,s) uses a strictly lower number of
signals, and therefore it is strictly dominated. Lets deﬁne:
z
1
n =m i n
©
z ∈ N





and vn = z1
ns − q∗
n +1 .I t c a n b e v e r i ﬁed that vn ∈ [0,s] for any n,s ovn is a sequence
of positive integers bounded above by s, moreover, since q∗
n − 1 ≤ n−1
2 (this follows from
q∗
n ≤ n+1
2 ), T ≥ 2 implies z1
ns<n(i.e., z1
n is not the last stage of the voting game). Given
















¯ ¯x = b,Pq∗
n
¤ª
.S i n c e q∗
n −
1 ≤ n−1
















n (γ,θ) converge to zero and therefore
c1(n)
c2(n) is lower than 1 for for n large enough. It
follows that there is a n such that for n>n the set (c1(n),c 2(n)) is always non empty. We
n o ws h o wt h a tw h e nc ∈ (c1(n),c 2(n)) there is at least a history with positive probability
in correspondence of which the simultaneous election strictly dominates the sequential
election. Consider the sequential game, and assume that all the agents except at most
an agent (say i) who votes in stage z1
n+1are voting informatively after a history in which
the probability of being pivotal is larger than zero. Clearly if this were not the case, then
the sequential game would be dominated by the simultaneous game and the result would
be proven. Let us deﬁne h∗(z1
n) as a history of length z1
n in which q∗
n − 1 voters have
voted "yes" and vn have voted "no". Consider voter i who decides his action in stage
z1
n+1after observing history h∗(z1
n) and a signal "b." The probability that this voter will
be pivotal given history h∗(z1
n) is the probability that all the following voters vote "no"
(conditional on history h∗(z1




n (α,θ) deﬁn e di n( B . 3 ) . T h e r e f o r ea nu p p e rbound on the expected beneﬁtf o r
voting by this voter is given by c1 (n)=d
q∗
n−1,vn
n (α,θ)EV.A f t e r s u c h a h i s t o r y , t h e
expected utility of voting "no" for agent i at stage z1




n (α,θ)EV < c and, therefore, he would abstain. So in an event in which history
h∗(z1
n) is realized and all the agents in the stages after z1
n observe a "b"s i g n a l ,Y would
27win, but N should win. In this case a simultaneous game would be strictly better.
Case 2: When q∗
n > n+1
2 , the same result can be proven with a completely symmetric
a r g u m e n t . I nt h i sc a s ew ed e ﬁne:
z
2
n =m i n
©
z ∈ N





We then consider the history h∗(z2
n) in which n−q∗
n agents have voted "no" and z2
ns−n+q∗
n
have voted "yes", and consider the decision of a voter who votes in stage z2
n+1 after history
h∗(z2
n) and observing a signal g.S i n c e n − q∗
n < n−1
2 and n − q∗
n →∞we can apply
Lemma 1 to replicate the argument used in Case 1 above.
Finally, note now that, since both c1(n) and c2(n) converge to zero as n →∞ , for any
ε small, there is a n∗ such that for n>n ∗, c1(n) <c 2(n) <ε .
We conclude with:
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . From the deﬁnition of c1(n) and c2(n),a n dL e m m a1 ,i t
follows that
c1(n)
c2(n) → 0 as n →∞ .
28Footnotes
1 Ar e l a t e db u td i ﬀerent situation occurs when many distinct elections are held in
sequence. In this case too historical data on previous votes is available (and may aﬀect
voters’ decisions), but here votes in previous elections do not directly aﬀect the outcome.
See McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) for an analysis of these mechanisms.
2 Quoted from Jackson (1983), pp. 615.
3 Dekel and Piccione (2000), pp. 35.
4 The observation that the act of voting is costly has a long tradition in political science:
Downs (1957), Tullock (1967), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983a)
and (1983b).
5 See Jackson (1983), for instance. Rosenthal and Sen (1973) provide evidence that
the choice of abstention strategically depends on the probability of being pivotal.
6 A more detailed account of this debate is presented in Section 4.
7 Two prominent examples are George McGovern in 1970 and Jimmy Carter in 1976.
See Morton and Williams (1999) and Morton (2004) for a discussion.
8 Morton and Williams (1999), pp. 51.
9 See Morton and Williams (1999), pp. 51.
10 This condition is satisﬁed if, for example, signals are aﬃliated.
11 For any n-tuple z, Tijz is the n-tuple obtained from z by exchanging zi and zj.
12 In this case, after conditioning on pivotal events with diﬀerent abstention rates,
posterior beliefs may be diﬀerent.
2913 To generalize the result to the case with abstention and discrete signals, therefore,
we would need to make additional assumptions on the types’ distribution that rule out
ties in equilibrium. Note, however, that for any arbitrarily small but positive c,t i e s
are often necessary to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in large elections when
signals are discrete.
14 Clearly, the expected utility of voting for an alternative is the beneﬁto fv o t i n gn e t
of the cost of voting: usim
i (Y,xi)−c. In this case, since c =0 , the distinction is irrelevant.
The same observation is true for u
seq
i (Y ;hti,x i) deﬁned below.
15 With abstention a slightly more subtle issue needs to be taken care of regarding
mixed strategies after events in which the probability of being pivotal is zero, but it does
not aﬀect the basic intuition. See the Appendix for details.
16 dxe is the smallest integer larger or equal than x.
17 Note, moreover, that while we use the assumption of a continuum of types for
Proposition 1, Proposition 2 holds even with discrete types.
18 The probability of committing a mistake is the probability of choosing Y in state N
plus the probability of choosing N in state Y . In our environment the distinction between
errors of type I and errors of type II is not important since the utility is symmetric in
the states of the world. Even if these errors were diﬀerent, however, the result presented
below would immediately generalize if we measured the informational performance with
any weighted average of the two types of error: indeed both errors would be reduced.
19 The sequential voting game has many equilibria which may have diﬀerent informa-
tive properties.
3020 Bartels (1986), pp.21.
21 See also Aldrich (1980) for an analysis of momentum in sequential elections.
22 Dekel and Piccione (2000) study a model in which all voters receives signals of
the same quality. This is a natural assumption in large non anonymous elections; in
small elections, however, some voters may be recognized as more informed than others.
Although the main idea that voters condition their action on being pivotal is still valid,
information cascades are possible with asymmetric signals. A complete characterization of
the equilibrium sets with asymmetric signals, therefore, seems a proﬁtable (and still open)
research question that may contribute to determine conditions under which bandwagon
eﬀects occur in small, non anonymous elections (as, for instance, in a faculty meeting).
23 If π were diﬀerent from 1
2 or one expert had a more informative signal than the
other, then a voter would not be exactly indiﬀerent between the options in the pivotal
event; this, however, would not be relevant for the result: if the cost of voting is large
enough (as in this example), the voter would still ﬁnd it optimal to abstain. Indeed,
in correspondence to the pivotal event, the fact that the other voter has an opposite
signal always reduces the expected beneﬁtt ov o t e( c o m p a r e dt ot h ec a s ei nw h i c hav o t e r
determines the outcome alone).
24 With probability λ the other voter is abstaining and the beneﬁt of voting (excluded
the cost of voting) is λ
2(2p − 1); with probability 1 − λ, both voters are voting but when
the voter is pivotal, there is no beneﬁt of voting since the voter is indiﬀerent between the
options. For the net beneﬁt of voting we need to subtract the cost of voting c = α
2(2p−1).
3125 If the ﬁrst voter abstains, then the second voter would ﬁnd optimal to vote infor-
matively. If the ﬁrst voter votes, then (in this equilibrium) the second voter assumes
that the ﬁrst voter has voted informatively and he would ﬁnd optimal to abstain: either
h ew o u l dh a v et ov o t ea st h eﬁrst voter, but this would be useless; or he has an opposite
signal, and then he is indiﬀerent between the alternatives. Given this reaction of voter
2, it is optimal for the ﬁrst voter to abstain.
26 When there are more than two voters we may have more that one symmetric equi-
librium in the simultaneous game, but a similar equilibrium can be found. Note moreover
that the simultaneous election has other non symmetric equilibria (as when one of the
two voters abstains and the other votes informatively); still the symmetric equilibrium is
dominated by the equilibrium of the sequential game.
27 Interestingly the fact that the likelihood of turnout among Republicans fell more
then among democrats, contradicts the behavioral assumption that voters like to vote for
the winner.
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